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Abstract 
This paper explores the following chain of conjectures: rising use of the internet, the 
widespread access to global information, and intensified communication between regions 
and countries brought about, for example, by intensified trade links bring about 
expansion of people’s social space and their set of comparators; this expansion increases 
people’s stress and strengthens their inclination to resort to migration as a means of 
reducing this heightened stress. Other things held constant, the expansion of people’s 
social space intensifies their inclination to move across geographical space.    
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1. Introduction 
Economists and others have done considerable empirical work on the importance of 
social interactions and comparisons with others in a number of spheres including 
consumption choices, financial decisions, a variety of risky behaviors, and migration.1 
One insight from this body of work is that comparisons with those who are “doing better” 
yield stronger effects than comparisons with those who are “doing worse”. Another is 
that relative deprivation is a statistically significant explanatory variable of migration 
behavior.   
Stark and Taylor (1991) show that relative deprivation increases the probability 
that household members will migrate from rural Mexico to the US. More recently, Quinn 
(2006) reports that relative deprivation is a significant motivating factor in domestic 
migration decisions in Mexico. Stark et al. (2009) explore the relationship between 
aggregate relative poverty, which is functionally related to aggregate relative deprivation, 
and migration. Drawing on Polish regional data, they demonstrate that migration from a 
region is positively correlated with the aggregate relative poverty in the region. Czaika 
(2011) finds that in India, relative deprivation is an important factor in deciding whether 
a household member should migrate, especially for migration over a short distance. 
Basarir (2012) reports that people in Indonesia are willing to bear a loss of absolute 
wealth if there is a relative wealth gain from migration. Jagger et al. (2012) demonstrate 
that relative deprivation is a significant explanatory variable of circular migration in 
Uganda. Drawing on data from the 2000 US census, Flippen (2013) shows that both 
blacks and whites who migrate from the North to the South generally have lower average 
absolute incomes than their stationary northern peers, yet, in the wake of their migration, 
they enjoy significantly lower relative deprivation. Vernazza (2013) finds that, even 
though interstate migration in the US confers substantial increases in absolute income, 
the trigger for migration is relative deprivation (low relative income), not low absolute 
income. Hyll and Schneider (2014) use a data set collected in the German Democratic 
Republic in 1990 to show that aversion to relative deprivation enhanced the propensity to 
migrate to western Germany.  
                                               
1 Soetevent (2006) surveys empirical approaches to identifying social interaction effects in a number of 
areas. Several overviews are in Benhabib et al. (2011). 
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Recent theoretical research has shown that the stress (relative deprivation) sensed 
by an integrated group is higher than the sum of the levels of stress (relative deprivation) 
sensed by the constituent groups when apart, a so-called superadditivity property (Stark, 
2013); in the aggregate, integration intensifies stress.  
Building on the empirical findings that stress (relative deprivation) matters for 
migration behavior and on the theoretical superadditivity insight, the purpose of this 
paper is to explore the following chain of conjectures: rising use of the internet, 
increasingly widespread access to global information, and intensified communication 
between regions and countries bring about expansion of people’s social space and of their 
set of comparators; this expansion increases stress, measured by aggregate relative 
deprivation; people are more inclined to resort to migration as a means of reducing this 
heightened stress. In short, other things held constant, expansion of people’s social space 
intensifies their inclination to move across geographical space. 
The approach taken in this paper is distinct from the intuitive perspective that 
access to media, information outlets and the like can reduce the incidence of migration 
because the destination is better understood so that going there just to find things out may 
not be necessary. We ought to bear in mind that better information about a destination 
can work both ways: it can reduce or increase the attractiveness of a destination. Better 
information can stop people over-estimating expected gains, thereby reducing migration 
(Farre and Fasani, 2013). On the other hand, better information can endow people with 
greater confidence about the outcome awaiting them, thereby increasing migration if 
people adjust their behavior in accordance with risk aversion preferences and consider 
migration to be risky. Here, we do not assign any characterization to the increased level 
of information following integration: the information expansion in that regard is perfectly 
neutral.   
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we define aggregate relative deprivation, and 
note that the aggregate relative deprivation of a merged population exhibits the 
superadditivity property. In Section 3 we briefly explain why the world is facing rising 
migration pressures. In Section 4 we show how and why exposure to heightened relative 
deprivation causes migration. In Section 5 we depict a connection between trade, which 
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we conceptualize as integration of economies, aggregate relative deprivation, and social 
welfare. This enables us to illustrate how trade can increase migration pressures. We then 
present our closing conclusions.  
 
2. Measuring aggregate relative deprivation, and the superadditivity property 
As in Stark (2013), we define the aggregate relative deprivation, ARD, of a population - 
an index of the population’s social stress - by the sum of the levels of stress (the sum of 
the levels of relative deprivation, RD) experienced by the individuals who constitute the 
population. We refer to income-based comparisons, and we quantify the individual’s RD 
by the sum of the excess income units that others in the population have divided by the 
size of the population (assuming that the comparison group of each individual consists of 
all the co-members of his population). 
The ARD of population P consisting of n  members in which an ordered vector of 
incomes is 1( ,..., )nx x x=  such that i jx x≤  for i j<  is defined as 
1 1
1 1 1
( ) 1( ) ( )
n n n
i j i
i i j in
ARD x RD x x x
− −
= = = +
= = −∑ ∑∑ , 
where 
1
( ) (1 )
n
i j i
j i
RD x x
n
x
= +
≡ −∑  is the relative deprivation experienced by an individual 
whose income is ix , 1,2,..., 1i n= − , and ( ) 0nRD x =  because in the income distribution 
of P there is no one to the right of the individual with income nx .   
Let there be 2l ≥  populations where the size of population kP  is kn , 1,...,k l= , 
and let the corresponding ordered vector of incomes of population kP  be 1( ) k
k k n
j jx x == . 
Integration of the populations is assumed to entail expansion of social space. The merged 
population is then of size 1 ln n n= +…+ , and the ordered income vector is denoted by 
1 2 lx x x x= … .  
Claim. The aggregate relative deprivation of the merged population exhibits the 
superadditivity property, namely 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2... ...l lARD x x ARD x ARD x ARD x≥ + + +  
Proof.  The proof is by induction with respect to the number of merged populations. 
A sketch of the proof is as follows. From Stark (2013) we know that the 
superadditivity property holds for 2l = . We assume that the property holds also for some 
2l >  merged populations. We can then show that it holds for 1l +  merged populations. 
The “trick” for achieving this is to merge the 1l +  populations sequentially; namely to 
first merge the first l  populations and subsequently to merge this new population with 
the ( 1)l th+  population. 
 
3. Rising migratory pressures 
The ease with which people in one population, region or country can relate to and 
compare themselves with people in other populations, regions or countries has never been 
as great as it is nowadays. Improved literacy, rising use of the internet, widespread access 
to global information, and intensified communication bring societies together. The 
seamlessness of this process implies that in terms of the set of comparators, regions 
“integrate” with regions, and countries “integrate” with countries in a manner that does 
not depend on trade links or the movement of people; physical flows across borders are 
not essential to replace the local and separated with the global and integrated. We refer to 
this form of integration as expansion of social space. And we draw extensively on the 
social-psychological concepts of relative deprivation and comparison groups.  
The superadditivity property presented in Section 2 indicates that as an expansion 
of social space, integration increases the aggregate relative deprivation sensed by the 
populations involved. However, this does not imply that in the wake of integration, no 
individual will experience a reduction in relative deprivation; often, and as illustrated 
below, some individuals may gain in terms of relative deprivation. But the increase in 
aggregate relative deprivation brought about by the integration of regions or countries 
implies that individuals in an integrated population experience jointly more relative 
deprivation than individuals in the constituent populations when apart.  
 5 
People do not like to be (more) relatively deprived, and thus react to their 
exposure to (increased) relative deprivation in a variety of ways, with migration being 
one of them. This reasoning is not meant to belittle the importance that people attach to 
absolute income and absolute wage gains. It does indicate, though, that people seek to 
improve their wellbeing even when their absolute income registers no change, yet their 
relative income is lowered (their relative deprivation rises). Clearly, a reduction in 
relative income can arise not only from a decline in absolute income but also from a 
revision of people’s social space which, for example, entails inclusion in that space of 
comparators with higher incomes.  
The relief that migration could confer in response to intensified relative 
deprivation does not necessarily arise from alleviating the relative deprivation component 
of people’s preferences: a gain in absolute income could compensate for a loss in 
wellbeing caused by increased relative deprivation - the compensation need not come 
from where the pain strikes, but it has to alleviate the pain. This, of course, does not 
negate the possibility of beneficial migration even when income remains the same but the 
incomes of comparators at destination are lower than the incomes of comparators at 
origin, for example. 
4. Links between relative deprivation and the propensity to migrate 
In this section we show how and why exposure to heightened relative deprivation can 
cause migration. We present several examples. We demonstrate how an integration-
induced revision of social space changes the inclination to migrate, and how this 
inclination might be affected by the size and composition of the set of regions. We then 
consider the role of wage differentials as triggers for migration, showing that when 
relative-deprivation considerations are taken into account, migration may not lead to 
wage equalization and may even encourage additional migration. We study relative-
deprivation-induced migration pressures under a positive wage differential as well as 
under a negative wage differential. 
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4.1 Examples of an increasing inclination to migrate in the wake of integration 
To begin with, let there be two separate (non-integrated) regions, henceforth regions A 
and B, with region B’s individuals being uniformly richer than region A’s individuals. 
Other than that, in all relevant respects, the two regions are identical. Suppose that in the 
wake of migration from region A to region B, an individual obtains a small increase in 
his income (such that the increase will not make him the richest in region B). The income 
gain would make migration tempting. Yet in region B the individual will be exposed to 
higher relative deprivation than in region A, emanating from proximity to the rich natives 
of region B (a revision of the individual’s social space). Consequently, the prospect of 
relative deprivation may discourage migration. Suppose that having compared the small 
income gain and the considerable increase in relative deprivation, the individual from 
region A decides not to migrate. Now, in the sense of social space, regions A and B 
integrate. Whether the individual from region A likes it or not, the richer natives of 
region B are now in his comparison group. In this situation, the earlier loss that would 
have come his way from increased relative deprivation following migration is sunk (it 
happened anyway). Therefore, the migration originally contemplated will confer only an 
income gain. Given that decisions are made at the margin, migration to region B will 
occur.  
Consider next migration that is not related to a change in absolute income. Let 
there be region A where only one individual lives and earns income 2, region B where 
four individuals live and have incomes 1, 1, 2, and 2, and a richer region C, where only 
one individual lives and earns income 6. Other than that, in all relevant respects the three 
regions are identical. Consider the individual from region A. As a result of intensified 
communication and interaction between regions A and C, this individual becomes 
relatively deprived, being exposed to a comparison with the individual from region C. 
The individual from region A might find that even though if he moves to region B and 
earns there exactly the same as in region A, namely 2, he will benefit from the change of 
social space because upon migration his relative deprivation will decrease: using region B 
as his “base,” he will experience lower relative deprivation than using region A as his 
“base” ( 2
3
 in {1,1,2,2,2,6} rather than 2 in {2,6}). Awareness of C does not change upon 
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migration, but the base for the comparison with C does. Thus, as a consequence of being 
exposed to region C, the individual who thereby becomes relatively deprived will choose 
to migrate to region B in order to alleviate somewhat his increased relative deprivation. 
Then, we will have a case in which awareness of region C increases the opportunity cost 
of not migrating from region A to region B. Notably, in the absence of the “appearance” 
of region C, the individual from region A whose income is 2 has no incentive to migrate 
to region B. 
4.2 Additional reasoning for increased migration upon integration 
In the standard case in which a wage differential is the underlying cause of migration, 
movement from a low wage region to a high wage region can be expected to increase 
wages at origin and decrease wages at destination, such that sufficient migration will end 
up equalizing wages, thereby neutralizing the incentive to engage in additional migration. 
Not necessarily so, however, when migration is triggered by distaste for relative 
deprivation. To see this, suppose that individuals who are prompted to move from region 
A to region B by relative deprivation considerations enter the income distribution of 
region B other than at the bottom. They can increase the relative deprivation of the 
individuals in region B with lower incomes than theirs who, in turn, will then have a 
stronger, relative-deprivation-based reason to migrate. The migrants from A will reduce 
the pressure to migrate of those in region B who have incomes higher than theirs.2 When 
the former effect is stronger, migratory pressures could escalate, not dwindle. Taking the 
logic of this line of argument a bit further, migration from region A to region B could 
even prompt migration from region B to region A which, in turn, will trigger migration 
from region A to region B, and so forth. An example of such a constellation is in the 
Appendix. 
                                               
2 As an example: let the incomes in region B be 3, 8, and 9, and let the migration from region A to region B 
be of an individual whose income is 7. In this case, the relative deprivation of the region B individual 
whose income is 3 (the lowest income individual in region B) will increase from 1 11 44(5 6)
3 3 12
+ = =  to 
1 15 45(4 5 6)
4 4 12
+ + = = while, obviously, the relative deprivation of the region B individual whose income 
is 8 will decrease. 
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An important inference to bear in mind is that if the regions or countries merge at 
the same time as the income gap or the wage differential between the regions or countries 
is reduced (but not eliminated), then the pressure for migration could still increase, not 
decline.  
4.3 A relative deprivation incentive to migrate in the presence of a positive income 
differential 
We consider the possibility of migration from region A, where an individual with income 
1 is located, to region B, where everyone earns 2. Such migration will increase the 
income of the region A individual from 1 to 2. We look at two settings. In one setting, the 
individual with income 1 is alone in his region of origin (or, for that matter, with others in 
his region of origin who all earn 1). In another setting, the individual with income 1 is in 
his region of origin together with an individual who earns 5 (and possibly also with 
others who earn 1 each). In what follows, we address the case in which there is only one 
individual earning income 1 in region A. Our conclusion would not change if there were 
several individuals earning income 1 in region A.  
We first consider the setting where region A consists of two individuals earning 1 
and 5, namely the income distribution in region A is {1,5}. In this case, when the 
individual with income 1 moves from region A to region B and receives at destination 
income 2 (a migration denoted by {1,5}=>{2,2,…,2}), the individual obtains migration 
returns both from higher absolute income and from a reduction in relative deprivation; he 
was relatively deprived in region A, and he is not relatively deprived in region B. We 
now consider the other setting in which region A consists only of the individual earning 
1. Then, migration of this individual from region A to region B, {1}=>{2,2,…,2}, 
produces returns to the individual only from higher absolute income because in both 
regions the individual is not relatively deprived. Thus, in terms of opportunity costs, not 
migrating in the {1,5} setting of region A (or in the equivalent {1,1,1,…,5} setting of 
region A) carries a harsher penalty than not migrating in the {1} (or {1,1,1,…,1}) setting 
of region A. An increase of the cost of not resorting to an act strengthens the propensity 
to engage in the act.  
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4.4 A relative deprivation incentive to migrate in the presence of a negative income 
differential  
We consider the following example. Let there be two regions A and B. Let there be two 
individuals in region A whose incomes are y  and 3y , where 2y > . Let the individuals 
in region B earn no more than 2y − . The region A individual whose income is y  can 
migrate to region B where the income awaiting him is 2y − . (Similarly, we can assume 
that migration from region A to region B entails a cost of two units of income.) The 
individual likes absolute income and dislikes relative deprivation, and assigns to these 
two terms in his utility function the weights of α  and (1 )α− − , respectively, where 
( )0,1α∈ . Thus, the individual’s utility function can be represented by 
( ) ), (1xu x R DD Rα α−= − , where x  denotes the individual’s income, and RD  denotes 
his relative deprivation, as defined in Section 2, namely it is the aggregate of income 
excesses divided by the size of the population. Then, if 1(1 ) (3 ) ( 2)
2
y y y yα α α− − − < − , 
or, alternatively, upon rearrangement, if 
2
y
y
α <
+
, the individual will prefer to migrate 
to region B. Defining 0
1
22 1
y
y
y
α= ≡
+ +
, it follows that as y increases, 0α  increases: as 
incomes rise, the constraint on α  ( 0α α< ) for the individual’s preference to migrate to 
region B becomes weaker. This is intuitive because the higher is y, the less meaningful 
the difference between y and 2y − , so leaving region A for region B involves an 
increasingly smaller relative loss of income, along with a significant (complete) reduction 
in relative deprivation.  
4.5 Relative deprivation, relative risk aversion, and migration as a gamble 
It is possible, and in some contexts it is highly appropriate, to view migration as a 
gamble, for example, when an individual gives up employment at origin that pays poorly 
for the probability at destination of either better-paid employment or unemployment. The 
willingness to gamble can be measured by the coefficient of relative risk aversion. When 
regions integrate, aggregate relative deprivation is higher. In research in progress we find 
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that, holding income constant, people who are more relatively deprived exhibit lower 
relative risk aversion (the proof is available on request). Then, risk aversion becomes an 
intervening variable between relative deprivation and migration, and the prediction that 
migration is undertaken in response to, and as a means of, reducing relative deprivation is 
strengthened by the consideration that higher relative deprivation weakens attitudes that 
are antagonistic to the pursuit of migration.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The ideas presented above suggest an interesting link between trade, conceptualized as 
integration of economies, aggregate relative deprivation, and social welfare. We consider 
this link in order to inquire how trade can affect migratory pressures, and we then present 
our closing conclusion.  
We consider the following scenario. Economies that, to begin with, were 
separated are now integrated via trade. The trade lifts the earnings of some people, or of 
everyone. We consider the possibility that the trade-generated increase in incomes is 
accompanied by an increase in aggregate relative deprivation, which emerges as a result 
of integration of the economies. Naturally, the income increase affects positively the 
wellbeing of the individuals who experience the increase, while the heightened relative 
deprivation arising from the integration of the economies reduces their wellbeing. 
Suppose that the weight attached to relative deprivation in the individuals’ preferences is 
such that the overall impact on social welfare, measured by the aggregate of the levels of 
wellbeing of the individuals, is negative. In some circumstances, the negative impact 
might be negated by redistribution of income between the individuals in the trading 
economies. However, in other circumstances, the redistribution may fall short of 
delivering a welfare gain, especially when there is a deadweight loss of tax and transfer. 
Put succinctly, the distaste for relative deprivation renders trade less appealing when 
trade is viewed as a technology that integrates non-trading economies in the sense of 
merging separate social spheres into one. 
The constellation of trade gains being overtaken by relative deprivation losses can 
arise even when the income of every individual increases. Take, for example, the case in 
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which as a result of trade, the initial (pre-trade) incomes {1,2} are replaced by incomes 
{2,10}; the weight, α , accorded to the relative deprivation experienced by the lower 
income individual is large; and the preferences of that individual are given a high enough 
weight in the social welfare function. This implies that an increase in this individual’s 
relative deprivation will lower social welfare considerably.  
To begin with, under no deadweight loss of tax and transfer, both individuals can 
be made strictly better off with trade upon transfer of 4 income units from the higher 
income individual to the lower income individual; {6,6} strictly dominates {1,2} for all 
values of α . And keeping the higher income individual as well off as prior to trade, and 
the lower income individual strictly better off can be achieved even under an extreme 
deadweight loss that literally “wipes out” eight income units when taken away from the 
higher income individual, as then {2,2} dominates {1,2}.   
Suppose, however, that before trade took place, the two individuals in two 
separate economies earn 1 and 4 (there are no other individuals in the two economies). 
With and because of trade, the two economies integrate, and the individuals’ incomes 
rise, respectively, to 1 ε+ , where ε  stands for a small positive value, and 5. The lower 
income individual experiences an increase in relative deprivation. For the higher income 
individual to be as well off as before trade took place (not to be worse off than before), he 
will need to be left with 4. Then, under no deadweight loss of tax and transfer, the lower 
income individual can at most have 2 ε+ . Yet 2 ε+  in an income distribution { 2 ε+ , 4} 
could be worse for the lower income individual than having income 1 in income 
distribution {1} if his α  (the weight he accords to relative deprivation) is high enough. 
Conversely, for the low income - high α  individual to be at least as well off following 
the trade and integration, he will need to experience hardly any relative deprivation; in 
other words his income will need to be approximately equal to the income of the higher 
income individual. Given the possible redistribution of incomes within the population 
under no deadweight loss of tax and transfer, the lower income individual will need to 
have an income very close to 3 / 2ε+ , with the higher income individual having just a 
little more than 3 / 2ε+ . But this income redistribution will render the higher income 
individual worse off than before trade took place unless ε  is greater than or equal to 5, 
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which contradicts our initial assumption that ε  is small. What this example illustrates is 
that for there to be a strict social welfare gain from trade, the direct gains from trade need 
to be larger than some critical threshold. And an implicit consequence is that through the 
channel identified above, trade could result in increased migratory pressure.  
The long-held view that a narrowing income gap between rich and poor countries 
will lead to lower migration pressure is not encompassing enough to account for a 
situation in which rising incomes are accompanied by expansion of the comparison 
environment. While absolute deprivation (the prevalence of low incomes) declines, 
relative deprivation can increase and, with it, resorting to migration as a means of 
quelling heightened relative deprivation. That the world faces increasing, not dwindling 
migratory pressures can, at least in part, be attributed to the world experiencing rising 
aggregate relative deprivation as a result of global integration.     
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Appendix 
Let there be two regions, let the cost of moving between the two regions be nil, let the 
two regions be identical in all relevant respects, and let the individuals’ incomes be 
constant. This last assumption means that when an individual migrates, he takes along his 
income (as if he was born with that income, so to speak). The region in which an 
individual resides constitutes the individual’s comparison group. The individual prefers 
to be in the region where his relative deprivation is lower. The individual is rational, but 
not sophisticated: he cannot take into consideration the contemporaneous migratory 
behavior of other individuals, yet his wellbeing is affected by the migration behavior of 
all other individuals. Once the migration of others is unraveled, an individual can, 
without cost, adjust his location. When there is a tie, individuals stay where they are.  
Consider the following two examples. First, suppose that there are four 
individuals with incomes 12, 11, 8, and 5 who, to begin with, are all in region A. We 
refer to the individuals according to their levels of income, that is, an individual with 
income x is named individual x. Let empty region B come into being or become 
accessible. The evolving dynamics is depicted by the following sequence: 
  
A B 
→  
A B 
12
11
8
5
 
 12  
11
8
5
 
 
Because now none of the individuals has an incentive to migrate (migration will not 
lower the relative deprivation of any of the individuals), we conclude that a spatial steady 
state (a state in which no individual can gain from migrating, so all migration comes to a 
stop) is reached in just one period, with individual 12 in region A, and individuals 11, 8, 
and 5 in region B.   
Second, suppose that the income of the poorest individual is 1 rather than 5, so 
that we now have four individuals with incomes 12, 11, 8, and 1. Such a change alters the 
migration dynamics as reported above: it changes the consideration of the poorest 
individual and influences his region of choice which, in turn, affects the consideration of 
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individual 8 and his location decision; the change in the income of the poorest individual 
inflicts a “migration externality” on the second poorest individual. To see this, let all four 
individuals again begin in region A. Now empty region B comes into being. The evolving 
dynamics is depicted by the following sequence: 
 
A B 
→   
A B 
→   
A B 
12
11
8
1
  
 12   
11
8
1
  
12
1
  11
8
  
 
→  
A B 
→  
A B 
→  
12
8
1
 11 
12
8
 11
1
 
 
A B 
→   
A B 
→   ... 
12   
11
8
1
  
12
1
  11
8
  
 
We see that in this case, the process repeats itself ad infinitum and a steady state is not 
reached. The perpetual movement in this example (in which individual 8 will always 
want to be located where individual 1 is located, and individual 1 will always want to be 
located where individual 8 is absent) emanates from the fact that the behavior of 
individual 8 is “tied” to the presence of individual 1 in that this presence reduces the pain 
experienced by 8 in looking up at the top income individual in the region. 
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